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Abstract  
The recent Ebola Virus Outbreak had a devastating effect on West Africa's already feeble national health systems. We suggest that such an impact 
turned out to be catastrophic because it hit particularly hard human resources for health and the delivery of primary healthcare services, which are 
cross-sectional to any health system. National and international interventions failed to understand the nature of this interaction, and concentrated 
on attending urgent specific vertical functions to fight the outbreak - the pillars - such as surveillance, logistics, safe burials etc. Such patchwork 
and vertical intervention strategy was always going to fail to tackle a system-wide problem, particularly in already fragile systems. We suggest that 
future interventions will have to learn from the experience of past initiatives for the introduction of HIV-AIDS services, which started as vertical 
programs and ended up including ever growing health system strengthening components. 
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Commentary 
 
The devastating Ebola Virus Outbreak started hitting Western 
African Countries approximately one year ago; the first cases were 
reported on March 2014 in Guinea, and rapidly the epidemic spread 
into neighbor countries - Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Senegal. 
After one year of widespread transmission of Ebola Virus Disease 
(EVD) nearly 24000 cases - confirmed and suspect - were reported, 
with over 9800 deaths [1]. After just five months the biggest EVD 
outbreak ever seen had brought to their knees already weak health 
systems, and - although belatedly - the WHO declared the current 
outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. A 
heterogeneous and at times fragmented international response then 
begun to unfold, and a plethora of international and national NGO's 
started responding to the outbreak without a clear coordination. 
International humanitarian response to this crisis has been 
described unceremoniously as late and uncoordinated by the very 
supposed coordinators [2]. The EVD outbreak hit directly as well as 
indirectly primary health care services in all the countries. In Sierra 
Leone, where the authors of this paper had the chance to operate, 
the majority of regular health centers rapidly stood idle, not only 
because of the reduced number of healthcare workers, but also 
because of the unexpected decrease of patients. We found that 
communities started avoiding the health facilities because of fear of 
being identified as suspect cases and of the stigma of being hold in 
quarantine for all the family and community. To compound such 
situation, we found EVD had an indirect effect on public health 
services such as on the reproductive health services of these 
countries, where quality services and skilled human resources were 
scaled down due to fear to deal with suspected Ebola cases in 
pregnant women [3]. We found that the international community 
unwillingly contributed to exacerbate the human resources for 
health shortage in ebola-affected countries; over the last year 
International and national NGO's started advertising ebola-related 
openings, offering different experiences and motivations to engage 
with the epidemic response - as well as sometimes higher salaries - 
to attract local staff already willing to trade their ill-paid jobs at 
Ministry of Health (MoH) departments for an NGO experience. This 
inevitably created a gap of human resources available to run regular 
National Health Service programs, particularly in primary care. In 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) focal points from different 
programs were appointed by the national MoH to integrate the 
NGOs task force during the Ebola outbreak; the unintended 
consequence of such a call was the interruption of regular activities 
in the Malnutrition and Tuberculosis programs, and well as in 
regular primary care visits. In Sierra Leone because of the 
simultaneous activities intended to curtail the trend of the epidemic, 
several Primary Health Units (PHU) were found often idle once all 
their regular health staff had been involved directly or indirectly in 
these activities, and regular services such as antenatal care and 
vaccination were interrupted for few days. In the EVD outbreak in 
DRC, to our surprise we found that at some stage regular patients 
started going to Ebola treatment centers to seek for primary care 
instead of the regular primary health centers, as they soon realized 
that the PHU couldn't respond to their basic needs, due to lack of 
medicines and medical equipment, while Ebola Treatment Centers 
(ETCs) were conspicuously well stocked. In a preexisting situation of 
poor service provision, ETCs were perceived by the population as an 
unexpected access door to decent health care, and this contributed 
to the reduction of demand for traditional primary health care 
services. 
  
The creation of holding centers in Freetown, Sierra Leone, was 
merely conceived as a 'band aid' strategy to contain the epidemic, 
due to shortages of ETCs beds. Broadly speaking, these centers 
were only meant as a physical barrier where suspected cases could 
wait for the ambulance, or in severe cases, -the place where 
infected body could be isolated, until the burial team arrived. Even 
though these centers were not designed for treatment or service 
delivery, their health staffs were charged with managing the 
communication as well as coordination with central department to 
activate the system. As such staffs were also in charge for regular 
PHUs management and for other health activities, their new 
responsibilities created a functions overload, which exacerbated 
absenteeism and at time, interruption of regular health services 
such as assisted deliveries, antenatal care, under 5 consultation, 
and immunization campaigns. Interestingly a striking parallel could 
be drawn with the same constrains described in Mali and others 
countries following the scaling up of those Global Health Initiatives 
actions specifically focused on HIV-AIDS in those countries where 
disruption of basic health services was already the norm rather than 
the exception [4]. We have come to realize that a complex 
emergency such as the recent EVD outbreak, with over a year of 
devastating consequences, will always have a systemic impact 
among health systems, on its human resources, as well as on its 
supplies. However, reviewing the responses from different NGO's 
and MoH, we assisted to a fully-owned vertical strategy focus on the 
pillars-surveillance, safe burials, social mobilization, case 
management, logistics, communication, child protection and 
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coordination-which was inherently inadequate to counteract EVD's 
system-wide shock. For example, a confirmed case of Ebola will 
always need interventions from all the pillars, from the moment that 
this person is admitted in an Ebola Treatment Center until the 
discharge; however, as the number of players involved in dealing 
with the case was high and the communication and coordination 
low, a gap in the response to the patient and community needs was 
soon created. Although the perverse effect of adopting vertical 
strategies to deal with system-wide health issues has been well-
documented, particularly in the case of HIV-AIDS services [5], also 
for the present epidemic international NGO's resorted to design their 
intervention focusing on vertical strategies and ignoring the 
systemic impact of an outbreak. We suggest that the current EVD 
outbreak would have needed an integrated and systemic response. 
These affected countries health system's already have feeble sectors 
from (workforce capacity to laboratory and other medical 
infrastructure, as well as a lack of adequate surveillance, 
information, and rapid response systems.) [6]. The international 
response should have been more coordinated, strategic and 
proactive [7], learning from the recent mistakes done in a not so 
distant past. We believe that the response to the current EVD 
outbreak has not been different from responses to other epidemics 
and lessons learnt from the past - particularly when AIDS services 
were introduced in already feeble health systems - should have 
been taken in greater consideration, as decontextualized focus on 
HIV/Aids controlled to (multiple and parallel coordinating bodies 
with a lack of leadership and overview), as well as to a distortion of 
existent national policies and parallel monitoring and evaluation 
systems [5]. Also when high-cost AIDS services were first 
introduced by international NGOs in run-down facilities in the 2000s, 
patients rapidly learned how to play that unexpected provision of 
services to their advantage [8], and forcing international planners to 
include a system-strengthening component to their AIDS programs 
that could at least reduce the gap that was being created between 
AIDS-specific and regular services [9]. 
  
We believe that outbreak responses should be aimed at 
strengthening health systems, instead of piling on vertical and 
emergency activities. The strategy should be integrated in a 
comprehensive response from MoH and all stakeholders involved. A 
holistic EVD response focus on the pillars, but integrated on the 
comprehensive national health policies, could minimize the 
apparently inevitable gaps in health services delivery. In addition, a 
strong health workforce is a prerequisite for effective systems. 
Considering the impact of the current outbreak in human resources 
for health, the EVD outbreak response should have taken a systemic 
approach to such a scarce and volatile resource, promoting 
specialized training but also a generalized scaling-up exercise. The 
international response has been clearly delayed and uncoordinated. 
The impact of this fragmented response has led to parallel activities, 
overlapping with the fragile attempts of activities by the Ministry of 
Health. The focus on Ebola case management contributed to a 
weakening of the countries' health structures and fragmented 
services. Health workforces were also affected, not only through 
EVD deaths among health workers, but also through the scaling up 
of daily activities by International actors. Lessons from past 
epidemics as well as from previous experience of introducing 
vertical services across pre-existing weak systems should have been 
reviewed and incorporated to the current response from all 
stakeholders. The possibility of an integrated and comprehensive 
response existed, and after years of outbreak emergencies and 
vertical strategies, the international aid response should have known 
better and focused on health system strengthening, even for such 
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